• 2 Posts
  • 147 Comments
Joined 1 year ago
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Cake day: October 17th, 2025

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  • Didn’t know this:

    Shallow clones are awful. Run your own damn mirror if you’re going to do something nasty like that.

    Shallow is the default/recommended in a lot of places though apparently:

    Shallow wins the clone, every time, by 4-6x. Which is exactly why actions/checkout defaults to depth=1, why GitLab CI ships GIT_DEPTH=20, and why Vercel hard-codes --depth=2 with no way to change it.

    https://bex.co/blog/2026/08/08/git-push-paas-shallow-vs-partial-clone-build-checkout

    Separately, one source of the scraping:

    welcome to the wonderful world of “proxy SDK monetization.” It’s big business, and your TV is probably doing it.

    The link in the article is useful, https://spur.us/blog/smart-tv-apps-residential-proxy-sdks

    Amazon makes it explicit: its Device and System Abuse Policy prohibits apps that facilitate proxy services for third parties. Roku has reportedly shut the door too: Lowpass, syndicated at The Verge, reported that Roku bars developers from using Bright SDK and similar proxy services, and that Roku apps using the SDK disappeared after the company was contacted.

    LG and Samsung have not drawn an equivalent public line. That is the gap these apps are living in. The same business model that Amazon bans and Roku reportedly blocks is still showing up at scale on webOS and Tizen.

    It concludes:

    A TV app should not be able to quietly turn a living-room device into residential proxy infrastructure. Screensavers, games, clocks, and novelty apps can be boring, cheap, or ad-supported. If an app is going to monetize a household’s internet connection, the user should be clearly informed about what that means, how the connection will be used, and what risks and tradeoffs they are accepting.

    We need to help everyone in the world block their TVs from doing this, this is such an abuse of trust.









  • I agree 100%, this post is not a full rebuttal and does not tackle the concerns directly:

    • The character of the organisations in FIDO does not inspire confidence against lock-in or monopolistic behaviour
    • The possibility of future attestation cutting out those on ‘unapproved’ software and hardware.

    I agree parts of the tech are good, particularly the anti-phishing, anti-replay measures.

    This post seems to say passkeys are in good hands so nothing can go wrong, but I don’t think that’s enough.


  • The phishing attack could also try to convince you your bank had changed domains (hey we’ve been bought by Big Bank and will be moving your account to BigBank.com) and therefore not to expect your password manager to autofill (this is a stretch I know).

    Passkeys are resistant to phishing as they cannot be replayed and your authenticator should refuse challenges from the wrong domain. Even if it did solve a challenge from bigbank.com it’s worthless as the origin is included in the returned challenge so cannot be used by the attackers on the real bank site.